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Article 2

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 3, Number 2, Summer 1972

The Federal Income Tax Effect of Novation
of Marital Settlement Agreements
Joseph N. DuCanto*

INTRODUCTION

In 1971 approximately 750,000 divorces were granted in the United
States, thus adding a million and a half citizens to the large-and
growing-pool of the "formerly married." It is thus safe to estimate
that there are, literally, tens of millions of Americans who are currently
living under the guidance and economic confines of marital settlement
agreements executed by them, or under decrees of court imposed upon
them, articulating the dimensions of their legal rights and responsibilities as to support and care of the divorced spouse and progeny of the
now-dissolved marriage.
Despite the very best which competent and capable counsel can do to
devise marital settlement agreements which will serve the present and
future needs of their clients, inevitably unforeseen personal, social and
family changes will frequently occur which make such existing agreements less than desirable at best, and sometimes completely oppressive
in their ongoing effect upon one or another of the parties. When such
* J.D. University of Chicago (1955). Mr. DuCanto has been a Visiting Professor of Family Law at Loyola Law School since 1967. This article is adapted from
one of a series of lectures presented by Mr. DuCanto in connection with a seminar
for sitting judges and practicing matrimonial attorneys which was entitled "Tax,
Financial and Estate Planning of Marital Agreements." The lectures were jointly
sponsored by Loyola University School of Law and the American Academy of Matrimonial Law and were conducted at Loyola Law School during March through May
of 1972.
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changes in circumstances arise, it often becomes patently advisable for
the parties to formulate and agree upon necessary changes in the existing agreement which will adequately reflect the new and different family and personal problems presented. In doing so the parties and their
counsel must be made aware that substantial changes or "novation"
of an existing marital settlement are often accompanied by very important federal income tax consequences.
II
BAsIc CONCEPT OF NoVATION

The basic concept of "novation," in its most simplistic form, isthat,
just as parties are free to contract in the first instance, they are free
thereafter to amend their existing agreement and make, yet again, a
new contract.'
There are basic limitations upon a court's right to unilaterally impose or direct changes in a marital settlement agreement incorporated
into a "consent decree" adopting an agreement of the parties with reference to either (1) a settlement of property rights, or (2) a lump sum
settlement (frequently paid in instalments) of wife's support rights,
such as a lump sum settlement in lieu of "alimony."'2 In such instances the court's jurisdiction is usually limited to
(a) enforcement of the terms of the incorporated agreement
(irrespective of whether the court originally had jurisdiction to impose
the terms of the consent decree); or
(b) modification of the support aspect where child support or
straight alimony is involved, and then conditioned only upon a showing
of "changes of circumstances" since entry of the decree warranting a
revision as to support.
Thus the reserved right of the parties to agree upon post-decretal
changes, and to have such changes endorsed by way of a modifying
order of the court, is of paramount importance; parties to these agreements need not feel that they are "carved in stone," forever immutable
in form and content.
i
DEGREE AND CHARACTER OF CHANGE

There are basically three major configurations in terms of the time
and character of changes in these agreements. These are:
1.
2.

LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS 28 (Matthew Bender).
See 2A, NELSON ON DIVORCE, 17.03 at 19-37.
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(1) A "nuc pro tunc" amendment or reformation by the court which
originally entered the decree, generally accomplished in close proximity
to the date of actual entry of the decree;
(2) Renegotiation of limited aspects of an existing plan, leaving
the original format of the agreement otherwise substantially intact, such
as an agreed upon reduction in monthly payments on a lump sum settlement in lieu of alimony, or a property settlement; or
(3) A complete restructuring of the remaining obligation into an
entirely different form and substantially revised basic content than
originally agreed upon.

IV.
A "NUNC PRO TUNC"

REFORMATION

Although the idea of a divorce decree amended nunc pro tunc
seems to define a precise problem, the concept has within it two different and significant problems: A decree may be amended to reflect
a retroactive change which facilitates a secondary agreement by the
parties (such as specifying who is to have exemptions for the children
where the original agreement is silent), or, it may be amended to correct an actual error in the original decree. Each of these kinds of
changes brings with it totally different federal tax consequences.
When a decree is amended retroactively such that it attempts to provide retroactive benefits, benefits or money not originally entered, the
reformation cannot affect the tax consequences of the payment already made thereunder.' The basic rule is hence quite clear: The determination of federal income tax consequences is not controlled by
retroactive judgments of state courts.4
Thus a retroactive amendment to a decree cannot change the federal
tax consequences already incurred under the decree as originally entered; the best that can be accomplished is some tax benefit prospective
in character.
V.
CORRECTION OF ERRONEOUS DECREES

The rendition of a nunc pro tunc order to correct some erroneous
aspect of a decree will be controlling for federal tax purposes. A good
3. Diane v. Comm'r, 168 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1948).
4. Segal v. Comm'r, 36 TC 148 (1961); Turkoglus v. Comm'r, 36 TC 552 (1961);
Van Vlaanderen v. Comm'r, 10 TC 706 (1948), afId, 175 F.2d 389 (3rd Cir. 1949).
See also IT 4092, approving the results in the foregoing cases.
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example of this doctrine is found in Johnson v. Comm'r.5 In the Johnson case a decree of divorce provided for the payment of $75 per week
unallocated alimony and child support although the actual intentions
of the parties (and the court) was to provide $75 per week for child
support only. The wife had proved that the trial judge's oral decision
had clearly specified the $75 per week as "child support" only. The
court here emphasized the distinction between the correction of an error in the statement of the court's actual order, and one in which there
is a later attempt by the parties to correct some deficiency in the original decree, retroactively, which presumably was not an actual judicial
error. In the former situation, a retroactive change will be effective
to change the federal income tax consequences, even though the taxable year in question has passed and is thus closed, whereas, in the latter
situation no retroactive change in the federal tax consequences will be
permitted.8
Further expanding the Commissioner's position, in 1971 the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 71-416,1 which provides that the
retroactive correction of a mathematical error in a decree will be given
full retroactive effect for federal income tax purposes. This ruling
further modified the Commissioner's earlier rulings in this area" with
respect to the tax effect of nunc pro tunc orders.
In summary, then, it now appears that a nunc pro tunc order issued
to effect a secondary agreement by the parties will not be granted retroactive effect for federal income tax purposes. Conversely, a retroactive
correction of an actual, provable, error in an existing decree will be
granted retroactive treatment for federal income tax purposes.
VI.
NOVATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF EXISTING PLANS
Section 71(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a divorced spouse's reportable gross income must include the value of "periodic payments" received if certain qualifications are met. There is
also a reciprocal right in the payor spouse under Section 215(a) to deduct such amounts which are includable under Section 71 in the payeespouse's gross income. One such qualification for taxability and de5. 45 TC 530 (1966).
(Compare, however, Saralee Lust v. Comm'r, 30 TCM
281 (1971).
6. Sklar v. Comm'r, 21 TC 349 (1953); Vargason v. Comm'r, 22 TC 100 (1954).
7. Rev. Rul. 71-416,26 CFR 1.71-1 (1971).
8. IT 4108.
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ductibility is that payments must be made "incident" to a divorce or
separation. The question therefore immediately arises as to what effect a substantial modification or renegotiation of a marital settlement
agreement will have on the taxability of payments made after a modification. Will the taxability of the payments made pursuant to the new
plan be determined by the prior tax status or by the nature of the new
payments? That is, will the tax treatment of the newly agreed upon
payments be controlled by the prior payments' tax status or will they
take on a new and different character? Additionally, is the new agreement, entered into many months or years following the actual decree
itself, "incident to such divorce or separation" as required under § 71
(a)(1)?
Virtually all of the answers to these questions can be found in Newton v. Pedrick.9 The court here determined that the words "incident
to such divorce" referred to the STATUS of divorce and, if a support
obligation survives a decree of divorce (by decree of court or by agreement), a later adjustment of its financial terms (by decree of court or
by subsequent agreement) will also be "incident" to the divorce in
compliance with Section 7 1(a)(1) of the Code.' 0
The existence of some support obligation at the time of modification
of the decree or agreement incorporated within the decree is of critical
importance in meeting the "incident to" test. Without existence of
some support obligation there cannot be newly instituted an obligation
in the nature of "periodic payments." Ample verification of the foregoing general principle is found in Revenue Rulings 60-141 and 60142.1"
In Rev. Rul. 60-141, husband and wife entered into a separation
agreement "whereby the husband agreed to pay his wife a specified
sum monthly for her support and maintenance until her death or remarriage." The agreement was clearly obligation for the support of
the wife, the agreement was not merged into nor adopted by the court
(which recognized existence of the agreement and therefore made no
support provisions for wife), and the payments thereunder clearly
qualified as "periodic payments." Some years thereafter, the former
wife having fallen on hard times and the husband's economic position
9. 212 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1954). See also Rev. Rul. 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 31,
which affirmed and adopted the reasoning of the Pedrick case, and Hollander v.
Comm'r, 248 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957).

10.

Hollander v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957); Andrews v. Comm'r,

18 TCM 388 (1959); and Walsh v. Comm'r, 21 TC 1063 (1954).
11. Rev. Rel. 141, 142, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 33, 34.
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having improved since the divorce, husband agreed to increase the
amount of support to his former wife. Since husband's support obligation still survived at the time of the agreed upon change, notwithstanding that the support obligation had been limited by the terms of
the original separation agreement, the increased payments agreed upon
by husband were "incident to" the divorce and hence the new payment
schedule qualified as "periodic payments."
The foregoing result is in stark contrast to Revenue Ruling 60-142.
Here husband and wife had entered into a true property settlement
agreement which made absolutely no provision for wife's support and
maintenance, and in fact (although not completely clear from the
text), wife appears to have waived all rights to maintenance and alimony. The ensuing divorce decree adopted the property settlement
agreement, although the agreement survived the decree, thus retaining
its independent legal significance. Following the divorce, the wife remarried and she and her former husband amended their agreement,
attempting thereby to achieve "periodic payment" treatment for subsequent amounts to be paid by the husband to his former wife. In clear
terms, then, these parties seem to have attempted a transmutation of
the husband's obligation to pay for wife's property interest, a non-deductible pay-out, into a tax deductible item-"periodic payments!"
Quite apart from this consideration, however, Rev. Rul. 60-142 disallowed the claim to "periodic payments," holding as follows:
In the instant case, no obligation to support survived the dissolution of the marriage. The agreement and decree made a final
and permanent adjustment of the parties' rights and obligations.
In light of the foregoing, it is held that payments made under
the amendatory agreement do not constitute payments made because of the marital or family relationship in recognition of the
general obligation to support. Therefore, such payments are not
includable in the wife's gross income under section 71 of the Code
and are not deductible by the husband under section 215 of the
Code. .... 12
Inevitably the following question is bound to be raised by those who
must test the outer limits of all rules: "Is the survival of a 'child support' obligation sufficient to sustain a post-decree amendment transmuting existing child support payments into a "periodic" form under
Lester v. Commr.?"'13 Implicit in the question is that wife has waived
her right to alimony and, following the decree, has only an existing
12.

13.

242

Rev. Rul. 142, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 34, 35.

366 U.S. 299 (1961).
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right to receive non-taxable "child support" under Section 71(b).
Unfortunately, no clear answer appears in the cited cases or Revenue
Rulings, all of them being quite careful to emphasize the existence or
non-existence of the legal obligation to support the wife, uncomplicated
by the presence of a parallel legal and "family obligation" to support
children. Thus what follows must be regarded as the author's informed
judgment, unsupported to date by clear authority sustaining the analysis.
It is the author's opinion that, notwithstanding a waiver of alimony
by a wife, where there still survives a legal obligation as to the support
of minor children of the dissolved marriage, there can be post-decretal
payments, or a post decretal amendment effected, which will qualify
such payments as "periodic," hence taxable to wife and deductible by
husband. In order to accomplish this result, however, either in the
original proceedings or in a subsequent post-decretal amendment, it
would be absolutely essential that the initial or amendatory support arrangement not be merged into a decree where the local state law prohibits the payment of "alimony" subsequent to a waiver or remarriage
14
of wife.
VII.
DISCONTINUANCE AND SETTLEMENT OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS

Frequently, after a marital agreement has been in effect for some
years, the parties may mutually desire termination of the existing
open-ended support plan in favor of a lump sum settlement in lieu of
all future support payments. What are the tax consequences of the
ensuing arrangement? If, for example, payment of support is being
made which qualifies as "periodic," what would be the ensuing tax effect of a lump sum payment in lieu of all future support payments?
Will the lump sum payment also receive treatment as "periodic payments" under the Code?
Section 71 of the Code sets forth the basic standards by which periodic payments must be measured, initially and at later times. In
Loverin v. Comm'r.'5 the court reviewed a situation in which a taxpayer was obligated to pay his ex-wife $60 per week for her support.
Several years subsequent to the divorce and effectiveness of the support agreement, the wife, wishing to remarry and thereby terminate her
existing right to support payments, entered into a modified settlement
agreement whereby wife agreed to accept a payment of $8,500 in lieu
14.
15.

See Brown v. Comm'r, 50 TC 865 (1968).
10 TC 406 (1948).
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of all future support payments. The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's determination that the $8,500 payment could not be accorded
"periodic payment" treatment and was, therefore, not taxable to wife
nor deductible by husband. In referring to the amendatory agreement
the Tax Court found as follows:
[lit is obvious that the written instrument of January 2, 1942 contemplated neither periodic payments nor installment payments of
a specified principle sum extending over a period of more than 10
years. It dealt only with a single, lump sum payment. The entire principal sum specified in the instrument was in fact paid at
one time. The payment does not fall within the preview of Section
22 (K) [the 1939 Revenue Code counterpart of present § 71],
and accordingly petitioner may not deduct any part of it under
Section 23 (U) [the 1939 Revenue Code counterpart of present
§ 2151.16
It is thus apparent that where a support obligation is terminated in
favor of a lump sum paid immediately such amount will not be accorded "periodic payment" treatment for tax purposes. Conversely,
where the support obligation is terminated in favor of a lump sum
payable over a period of time, then the same tax rules apply which would
otherwise have applied if the new agreement had been initially negotiated at the time of the divorce itself; for example, if the new series of
payments meet the test of "periodicy" under the Code and the Regulations, then it is irrelevant that the payments are newly created and implemented in lieu of a different, pre-existing, support obligation. This
doctrine is most clearly seen in Rev. Rul. 72-133, which provides as
follows:
WHERE husband and wife are divorced under a decree providing for child support and a settlement of property rights and annual alimony of $10,000 for wife, subject to termination upon her
death or remarriage, such decree having been in effect for several
years, and the parties agree to modify the open-ended alimony obligation as follows:
$60,000 to wife, payable $20,000 immediately and 8 quarterly
installments of $5,000 each, commencing 3 months from the date
of the initial $20,000 payment, in full satisfaction of all alimony
and support rights of wife,
STILL SUBJECT to termination upon wife's death or remarriage,
THEN the entire payout qualifies as "periodic" for tax purposes, includable in wife's income under § 71(a)(1) [citing
16.
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Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)], and are deductible to husband under
§ 215.17
Thus, husband could effectively pay wife $35,000 in one taxable
year, and have it all qualify as "periodic payments," the deal to be
completely paid off within 2-1/4 years of initiation. Thus, why pay
off with a non-qualifying lump sum when, presumably, an escrow
could easily be utilized to guarantee full payment of the agreed-upon
lump sum amount over an abbreviated period?
Also note that, unlike Revenue Ruling 60-142, we obviously have
no question here of the parties attempting to conceal or transmute a
payment into a payment for "support."
It must be noted, however, that just as the usual rules as to includability and deductibility are applied to "novated" payments as though
the marital settlement were immediately "incident" to the divorce, and
just as we have clearly determined that an executory agreement to pay
for "property rights" cannot be transformed into "periodic" support by
such an amendment, any attempt to discount existing arrearages of
"periodic payments" into a lump sum amount, attempting to gain
non-taxable treatment for the reduced payment in the recipient's
hands, is destined to fail:
EXAMPLE: Over a period of several years, due to adverse
health, or business reasons, husband falls $10,000 behind in payment of "pure" alimony, or in payment of installments of a lump
sum otherwise treatable as "periodic." He now has the money
and wishes to pay off wife entirely, for $25,000 in cash, and wife
is agreeable.
Tax Result: Since arrearages in payment of "periodic" support retain their essential tax character whenever paid,' 8 $10,000 of the
amount received by wife must be reported by her as "income" and
husband, correspondingly, has a deduction for the same amount.
The additional $15,000, since paid as a lump sum, not "periodic" in
character, is tax free to wife and is non-deductible by husband.
Implementing The Plan:
Wife hereby acknowledges receipt from husband of Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000) as and for payment of alimony arrearages upon sums previously due her from husband [under said decree of
divorce (or marital settlement agreement)]. She hereby further
acknowledges receipt from husband of an additional payment of
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000) as and for a complete waiver
17.

Rev. Rul. 72-133.

18. Grant v. Comm'r, 209 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1953); Dalton v. Comm'r, 34 TC
879 (1960); Rev. Rul. 457, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 527.
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by wife of any future right [under said decree or marital agreement, if any] she may have in and to alimony or support for herself from husband, and wife hereby does forever waive and release all past, present or future right she may have to receive alimony or support from husband under the laws of this or any other
state or country.

Obviously, this plan should be endorsed by a court if there is otherwise in existence a decree obligating husband to continue making future payments exceeding those now agreed upon under the novated
agreement.
CONCLUSION

It should now be abundantly evident that the creative and negotiating skills of the matrimonial lawyer are just as essential when planning
and negotiating a post-decree amendment to an existing marital settlement plan as they were in the initial instance where the agreement was
shortly followed by the divorce decree itself. In fact, it is often possible many months or years following actual achievement of the divorce, to negotiate a more sensible plan for the parties than was possible when great tensions and extreme emotions aurrounded achievement of the divorce itself.
The passage of time has a way of muting the pain, anger, and personal resentment which often becloud the judgment of the parties (and
not infrequently their respective counsel) during the critical months
and days preceding the divorce itself, such that the parties may later
be better able to more objectively evaluate their own positions and
needs than could have been expected under pre-existing circumstances. Adequate knowledge by counsel of the federal income tax
ramifications of novation of marital settlement agreements is indispensable if counsel is to bring to bear the full measure of creative negotiating and drafting skills possessed by him.
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